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THE PRIVATE PLACEMENT EXEMPTION AND
THE BLUE SKY LAWS-SHOALS IN THE SAFE
HARBOR
ROBERT M. ROYALTY* and THOMAS E. JONES, JR.**
I. THE PROBLEM
During the past 65 years, the federal and state securities regula-
tion laws have developed an increasingly significant regulatory road-
block between the seekers of capital and the furnishers of capital.'
The general format of these laws is that the seller of securities - the
seeker of capital - must register the securities under the Securities
Act of 19332 with the Securities and Exchange Commission (herein-
after called the "SEC") and with the securities commissioners of the
various states in which the securities will be sold prior to sale, unless
the offering fits within an exemption to registration requirements. A
principal exemption to the registration requirements of these laws is
the "private placement" or "limited offering" exemption.
Two developing factors in recent years have enhanced the value
of the private placement exemption: the skyrocketing costs of the
securities registration process; and the proliferation of new types of
investment vehicles whose financing fits into the private placement
mold, including tax shelter investment programs and private
investment funds. At the same time there have been some rather
dramatic developments in the area of the 1933 Act private placement
exemption and some less dramatic, but equally significant develop-
ments in the area of the state securities, or Blue Sky, law private
placement exemptions.
* Member of Georgia, District of Columbia and Illinois Bars. B.A. Beloit College,
1954; J.D. Harvard University, 1959. Mr. Royalty is Chairman of the State Regulation
of Securities Committee of the American Bar Association's Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law.
** Member of Georgia Bar. B.A. Emory University, 1971; J.D. University of
Georgia, 1974.
t The assistance of Ms. Jean W. Bitter and Ms. Kathryn L. McBride is gratefully
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I In this context, "capital" means both equity investment and long-term debt
investment, both of which are regulated "securities" under the federal and state securi-
ties regulation laws.
2 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. [hereinafter the "1933 Act"].
The chief admininstrative official of the securities regulation department in any
state may carry any one of a number of titles. For purposes of this paper, we will refer
to any such chief administrator as the "securities commissioner" or the "commis-
sioner."
878 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI
While the 1933 Act private placement exemption has proved to be
a remarkably difficult concept to reduce to preditable law,' it is the
only requirement to be met from the federal standpoint. In spite of
developments toward uniformity, the Blue Sky laws are still signifi-
cantly diverse, and the offeror seeking the private placement exemp-
tion must be sure to satisfy not only the federal requirements, but
also the requirements of each state in which he proposes to sell securi-
ties. This paper will explore these variances in state approach to the
private placement issue; it will point out how these varying exemp-
tions present some significant shoals, or rocks, in the safe harbor of
private placement which the SEC has made some effort to construct;
it will describe developing trends in the Blue Sky private placement
area; it will consider the merit of criticisms of the Blue Sky exemp-
tion; and it will offer some suggestions for future action.
It is helpful to keep in mind the types of security offerings which
most frequently seek the private placement exemption. In terms of
dollars, by far the most significant is the offering of long-term debt
issues of relatively seasoned companies to financial institutions such
as insurance companies and pension funds.5 Aside from that, there
are a number of differing types of equity offerings which seek the
exemption. In earlier years, the emphasis was on the capital needs of
small business,6 but in recent years companies whose operations are
more than locally significant have sought initial, and even second and
third round, infusions of equity through the private placement ex-
emption. Finally, a major recent trend has been the use of the private
placement exemption for pooled investment vehicles of all types in-
cluding cattle feeding and natural resources development tax shelter
programs, private securities investment partnerships, real estate land
and commercial building syndications, and any number of other busi-
ness enterprises sought to be developed through the pooled capital of
relatively modest ($15,000 to $25,000) equity investments.
II. THE FEDERAL APPROACH TO THE PRIVATE PLACEMENT EXEMPTION
A. Statutory Basis and Interpretation
The federal approach to the private placement exemption has, as
I See generally, Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on New Business Promotions, 1969
DUKE L.J. 273.
1 In 1975, some $12.5 billion of long-term debt was placed with institutions, and
this figure will probably be surpassed in 1976. FORBES, May 1, 1976, at 82.
See Garcia & Kantor, Dark Clouds in a Blue Sky: An Analysis of the Limited
Offering Exemption, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 568 (1969).
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does the Federal Constitution, the virtue of simplicity and brevity.
Like the Constitution, it has generated a multitude of interpretative
case law, and its meaning has, through this judicial interpretation,
somewhat changed through the years.
Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act provides:
The provisions of [the registration requirements of Section
5 shall not apply to . . . (2) transactions by an issuer not
involving any public offering.7
The legislative history of this exemption indicates that Congress in-
tended it to apply to the following situations:
(1) A specific or isolated sale to a particular person.
(2) Where there is no practical need for application of the
registration provisions of the 1933 Act.
(3) Where the public benefits of the registration provisions
are too remote to cause them to apply.
(4) Where the stockholders are so small in number that the
sale to them does not constitute a public offering.'
After the passage of the 1933 Act, practitioners relied principally
on a 1935 opinion of the General Counsel of the SEC9 (which clearly
did not exhaust the subject) for guidance in determining the proper
application of the exemption until 1953, when the Ralston Purina
case set forth some further, but still imprecise, guidelines.'" The SEC
sought to achieve further clarification in a 1962 release," but the
waters were muddied in the extreme by a series of cases in 1971 and
1972 which seemed to require, among other things, a preexisting rela-
tionship between the offerees and the issuer."2
B. Rule 146
The obvious problem with the Section 4(2) approach to the pri-
vate placement exemption is its lack of objective standards and the
7 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
a H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7, 15-16 (1933); see also H.R. REP. No.
152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-29 (1933).
SEC Sec. Rel. No. 33-285 (January 24, 1935), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2740-44.
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
" SEC Sec. Act. Rel. No. 33-4552 (November 6, 1962), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
2770-83.
11 SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Henderson v.
Hayden Stone, Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l
Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971); Lively v. Hirschfield, 440 F.2d 631 (10th
Cir. 1971).
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attendant difficulty of predicting the effects of a proposed method of
conduct. After 41 confusing years of experience with this approach,
the SEC promulgated its Rule 1461' effective June 10, 1974. This Rule
is designed to provide a safe harbor for the seeker of the private
placement exemption on the basis of largely objective standards. In
its Release issuing the Rule, the SEC stated:
The Rule is designed to provide more objective standards
for determining when offers or sales of securities by an issuer
would be deemed to be transactions not involving any public
offering within the meaning of the Act and thus would be
exempt from the registration provisions of the Act.'4
Briefly, Rule 146 says that the Section 4(2) exemption is available
for an "offering" of securities if:
1. There is no general solicitation or general advertising involved
in the offering.
2. The purchaser has sufficient knowledge and experience to
evaluate the offering or, if he does not, that he is able to bear the
economic risk of the investment and that he is represented by some-
one who does have the requisite knowledge and experience.
3. Each offeree or his representatives has access to, or is fur-
nished with, relevant material information about the offeror.
4. There are no more than 35 purchasers in the offering.
5. Specified steps are taken to prohibit the purchasers from re-
selling their investment in a public distribution (presumably unless
the securities are registered under the 1933 Act in connection with
such a distribution).
It is not within the scope of this paper to evaluate in detail the
merits of Rule 146. That has been, and is being done, with frequency
by other writers. 5 For our purposes it is sufficient to note that Rule
11 SEC Sec. Act. Rel. No. 33-5487 (April 23, 1974), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2710.
" Id.
" Two major criticisms stand out in the current commentaries on Rule 146. First,
it has been pointed out that compliance with the Rule, especially for the small issuer
may be almost as expensive as a full registration under the 1933 Act. A major basis
for this criticism is the Rule's requirement that the purchasers must either have access
to, or be provided with, the same information about the issuer as would be contained
in a 1933 Act registration statement. Second, despite the avowed purpose of the Rule
to provide some objectivity to the Section 4(2) exemption, many of the Rule's require-
ments require inherently subjective determinations. An example is the requirement
that the issuer determine the financial stability and sophistication of potential offerees
- often a very difficult task. See Alberg & Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147: The
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146 makes a significant change in the federal approach to the private
placement exemption - it represents a strong move toward objective
standards, but at the same time attempts to assure that the offerees
do not need the protection of the registration provisions of the 1933
Act.'6
C. Residual Law
The advent of Rule 146, which is clearly designed to be nonexclu-
sive as to the availability of the private placement exemption, 7 and
the continuing confusion created by the Hill York line of cases, 8 has
generated yet further analysis of what the federal private placement
exemption is outside of Rule 146. A thoughtful analysis of this "resi-
dual law" was developed by two Committees of the American Bar
Association's Corporation, Banking and Business Law Section, and
the results of their work have been published recently. 9 In these
papers, the authors give differing treatments to the equity offering on
the one hand and the long-term debt offering on the other, although
the statute does not.
The authors of the paper dealing with the equity offering conclude
that under the residual law there are four essential attributes to the
Non-Public and Intrastate Offering Exemptions from Registration for the Sale of
Securities, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 622 (1974); Rosenfeld, Rule 146 Leaves Private Offering
Waters Still Muddied, 2 SEc. REG. L.J. 195 (1974).
11 A comment on the philosophy of the protective purposes of the 1933 Act is
compelled. The 1933 Act is a disclosure statute; i.e., so long as the seller has met his
obligation to tell all that is material about itself and the offering, it is still thereafter
a matter of caveat emptor. There is not, and could not easily be, a method for the SEC
to assure that all the buyers in a registered public offering fully understand the intrica-
cies of the information given them by a 1933 Act Prospectus. But the SEC has been
more solicitous to the Rule 146 purchaser - either he must have the knowledge and
experience requisite to make the investment decision, or be rich enough to carry the
investment and be represented by someone who has such knowledge and experience.
This analysis suggests that there is still plenty of room for arguments in favor of the
Blue Sky merit review. See text of Section VI infra.
J In the second paragraph of Release No. 5487 the Commission states:
The Rule is not, however, the exclusive basis for determining whether
that exemption is available. Accordingly, although persons claiming
the exemption have the burden of proving its availability, persons
may continue to rely on the Section 4(2) exemption by complying with
the relevant administrative and judicial interpretations in effect at
the time of the transactions.
SEC Sec. Act. Rel. No. 33-5487 (April 23, 1974), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 2710.
" See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
" Position Papers, Private Exemption Under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of
1933, 31 Bus. LAW. 483 (1975).
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private placement exemption: (1) offeree qualification (which may be
sophistication or wealth); (2) availability of information about the
issuer; (3) a limited manner of offering through direct communication
with qualified offerees or their representatives; and (4) the absence
of redistribution by the purchaser. 0
The authors of the paper dealing with the long-term debt offering
similarly identify these same characteristics as essential for the exist-
ence of the exemption. They go on to point out that the nature of
institutional investors and of the typical institutional private place-
ment is such that the protection afforded by the 1933 Act is not
needed for a long-term debt placement. In other words, one of the
reasons for the Section 4(2) exemption is present in the long-term
debt private placement situation.2
D. Rule 240
Under Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act,2 the Commission is given the
authority to exempt certain securities from the registration require-
ments of the Act upon a finding that registration is not necessary in
the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the
small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering.
The Section goes on to set a limit of $500,000 on the amount of an
offering which may be exempted under the section. Pursuant to Sec-
tion 3(b) the Commission issued its Rule 240 effective March 15,
1975.23
Transactions by an issuer involving the offer and sale of its securi-
ties in accordance with all the terms and conditions of Rule 240 are
exempt from the registration provisions of Section 5 of the 1933 Act.
The requirements of the Rule, many of which are quite similar to the
requirements of the typical state Blue Sky private placement exemp-
tion, are as follows:
1. Limitation on Manner of Offering. The securities may not be
offered by means of any general advertising or general solicitation.
2. Prohibition of Remuneration Paid for Solicitation of Sales. No
commission or similar remuneration may be paid for soliciting any
prospective buyer or in connection with the sale of securities.
3. Limitation on Aggregate Sale Price. The aggregate sales price
of all sales of securities by the issuer within the twelve months pre-
" Id. at 489.
2 See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 77c(11)(b).
3 SEC Sec. Act. Rel. No. 33-5560 (March 15, 1975), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
80,066.
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ceding the point in time immediately after the last sale under the
Rule may not exceed $100,000; in other words, if no security sales
have been made within the past twelve months, then a total of
$100,000 in value of securities may be sold under the Rule.
4. Limitation on Number of Beneficial Owners. Both immedi-
ately before and immediately after any transaction in reliance on the
Rule, the issuer must reasonably believe that it has no more than 100
security holders.
5. Limitations on Resale. The issuer must exercise reasonable
care to assure that the purchasers of the securities are not underwri-
ters within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the 1933 Act. 4 In this
connection the issuer must:
(a) make reasonable inquiry to determine if the purchaser is
acquiring the securities for his own account or on behalf of
other persons;
(b) inform the purchaser of the restrictions on resale; and
(c) place a legend on the certificate stating that the securities
have not been registered under the Act and setting forth the
restrictions on transferability and sale of the securities.
6. Filing of Notice of Sales. As soon as $100,000 of securities have
been sold pursuant to the Rule, the issuer must thereafter file a Form
240 with the appropriate Regional Office of the Commission within
ten days after the close of the first month in which a sale made in
reliance on the Rule is made.
E. Summary of Federal Approach
In summary, the federal approach to the private placement ex-
emption is flexible and liberal.
First, the objective standards of Rule 146 are provided, which
gives the offeror a significant measure of predictability."8 Second, the
residual law of what's left in Section 4(2) is available to the offeror
who sets out in all good faith to design an offering in which the
24 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11).
SEC Sec. Act. Rel. No. 33-5560 (March 15, 1975), CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
80,066.
28 In this regard, mention should be made of a recent amendment to Rule 146(G).
SEC Sec. Act. Rel. No. 35-5585 (May 7, 1975) [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 80,168. The amendment provides that the offeror is protected so long
as he reasonably believes that there are no more than 35 purchasers, even though in
fact the numbers may exceed the limit of the Rule.
1976]
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protections afforded by the 1933 Act are not necessary.Y Third, Rule
240 provides a small issue safety valve for offerings up to $100,000.
Four aspects of the federal approach should be noted before
commencing an examination of the Blue Sky Law approach: (1) the
federal statute itself makes no distinction as to the type of offerees
involved; 8 (2) the federal approach does not require the absence of
commissions or other remuneration in connection with a private
placement; (3) in keeping with the 1933 Act disclosure philosophy,
there is no provision by which the SEC can review the merits of a
proposed private offering; 29 and (4) Rule 240 is silent on the question
of the investment sophistication of the offerees.
F. Proposed Federal Securities Code Approach
The federal securities laws have many imperfections, and an at-
tempt is being made to prepare a unified codification and improve-
ment of these laws under the auspices of The American Law Insti-
tute0 by seeking to develop a Federal Securities Code. Although this
project is still in the tentative draft stage, it is helpful to consider the
current thinking of the draftsmen of this proposal as to the private
placement exemption.
First, the proposed Federal Securities Code embodies a major
shift in approach from the existing pattern of securities regulation.
Under the proposed Code there is no requirement for the registration
of securities. Rather, the company is required to register with the
Commission when it first reaches $1,000,000 of assets and 300 record
holders of all its securities, or when the first "distribution" is made
of any of its securities.3 The basic theme "is a shift in emphasis from
' See Position Papers, Private Exemption Under Section 4(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 31 Bus. LAW. 483 (1975).
28 Although the federal statute makes no distinction as to the type of offeree
involved, at least one court has emphasized the "sophisticated knowledgeable [and]
experienced" character of two mutual fund plaintiffs in determining that the section
4(2) exemption applied. The Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, 64-66 CCH DEC. 91-
523 (S.D.N.Y. March 31, 1965). The Marcus case involved the sale of stock, and no
cases have been found discussing the 4(2) exemption in the area of private placement
of debt securities.
29 The SEC could, of course, enjoin the continuation of a fraudulent offering under
Rule 10b-5.
20 Although in this paper we will refer to the Federal Securities Code, it should
be remembered that the Code is at present in the tentative draft stage only. All
citations to the Federal Securities Code refer to the various tentative drafts published
by the American Law Institute.
21 FEDERAL SECURIIS CODE §§ 401-02 (Tentative Draft No. 3, October 1, 1974).
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the occasional, hit-or-miss, static registration statement under the
1933 Act to permanent company registration followed by the contin-
ual disclosure, on as current a basis as practical, more along the lines
of the 1934 Act."" The proposed Code still recognizes the need for,
and requires a special filing with the SEC at the time of a significant
distribution in the form of an "offering statement" as well as the
delivery of a prospectus to prospective buyers.m
The proposed Federal Securities Code provides an exemption
from its filing and registration requirements for offerings not involv-
ing a "distribution."3 The term distribution is defined to exclude a
"limited offering" which is in turn defined as one in which the follow-
ing conditions are satisfied: (A) the initial buyers of the securities are
institutional investors or consist of not more than 35 other persons,
or both; (B) resales of any of the securities to persons other than
institutional investors within three years do not result in more than
35 owners of such securities; and (C) the original offeror and all sellers
in such resales comply with any rules promulgated by the SEC."'
The proposed Code then states that the SEC is authorized to
require by rule: (A) that the seller obtain an appropriate written
undertaking from his buyer, (B) that the securities involved contain
an appropriate restriction on transferability, and (C) that any trans-
fer agent be given an appropriate stop-transfer notice designed to
avoid an illegal distribution. The Commission is given the further
authority to modify, by rule, the conditions of the exemption or to
require additional conditions."
This proposed approach contains many of the elements of present
Rule 146.
]H. THE BLUE SKY LAW APPROACH TO THE PRIVATE PLACEMENT
EXEMPTION
A. Introduction to Blue Sky Approach
1. Basic Format of Blue Sky Laws
Although traditionally Blue Sky statutes have been categorized as
either: (a) antifraud; (b) "broker" registration; i.e., registration of the
32 FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE at XIX. (Tentative Draft No. 1, April 25, 1972).
1 FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 501. (Tentative Draft No. 3, October 1, 1974).
31 FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 504. (Tentative Draft No. 3, October 1, 1974).
" FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 501. (Tentative Draft No. 3, October 1, 1974).
36 FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 227(b)(1). (Tentative Draft No. 3, October 1, 1974).
1' FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 227(b)(4). (Tentative Draft No. 3, October 1, 1974).
" FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 227(b)(3). (Tentative Draft No. 3, October 1, 1974).
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sellers of securities; or (c) securities registration in format, in fact, the
predominant Blue Sky pattern today is similar to the federal pattern
achieved by the 1933 Act and the Securities and Exchange Act of
193411 in requiring registration of both securities and the sellers
thereof.4 0
At present 48 states require some form of securities registration,"
and all states require some form of broker-dealer registration. The
Blue Sky laws of almost all of the securities registration states have
some form of private placement exemption from the registration pro-
visions. As will be seen from the analysis below, the varieties of types
of exemptions are many - in fact perhaps more than there are states,
because very few states have exactly the same approach, and many
have two and sometimes three different types of private offering ex-
emptions.
The basic format of the private placement exemption of the Blue
Sky laws, however, is similar. That format is: (1) to provide a statu-
tory exemption for any offering to financial institutions; (2) to pro-
vide special and separate handling for offerings of enterprises in the
preincorporation stage; (3) to provide by statute a general private
offering which contains an objective "numbers test," usually limiting
the number of offerees which are allowed for the exemption; (4) to
require that the purchasers buy the securities for investment pur-
poses only; and (5) to prohibit the payment of commissions in
connection with the private placement.
Consistent with the basic regulatory, as opposed to disclosure,
philosophy of many Blue Sky laws, the securities commissioners
have the power to prevent the making or continuation of a private
offering if the offering lacks sufficient business merit for purchases by
citizens of the state. This format differs in a number of material re-
spects from the federal approach."
2. Uniform Securities Act Approach
The Uniform Securities Act (hereinafter sometimes called the
"Uniform Act") was officially approved in 1956.11 It represents the
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. [hereinafter the "1934 Act"].
40 Registration of securities is required by Section 5 of the 1933 Act. 15 U.S.C. §
77e. The registration of brokers and dealers is required by Section 15 of the 1934 Act.
15 U.S.C. § 78o.
, Connecticut and New York do not.
42 See text of Section II E supra.
'3 The Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws on August 25, 1956.
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most recent comprehensive and considered thinking as to what a
model Blue Sky Act should contain (keeping in mind the practical
need recognized by the Draftsmen not to depart too dramatically
from existing law).44 For this reason, and because the Uniform Act has
been used as the statutory source of the Blue Sky laws in 32 states,
it is useful for the purposes of this article to examine in some detail
the Uniform Act approach to the private placement exemption. In
this regard, it must be kept in mind that we have not said that the
Uniform Act has been "adopted" in 32 states. The manner in which
the various states have worked from the Uniform Act pattern are al-
most as varied as the number of states which have used its format,"
and this was anticipated by the Draftsmen of the Act.46
Following the -basic state format, the Uniform Act divides the
private placement exemption into three parts. First, Section
402(b)(8) of the Uniform Act recognizes the absence of the need for
the protections offered by securities registration in connection with
sales to highly sophisticated institutional investors. That Section
exempts from registration:
• . . any offer or sale to a bank, savings institution, trust
company, insurance company, investment company, pension
or profit-sharing trust or other financial institution or institu-
tional buyer, or to a broker-dealer.
There is no limitation on the numbers of institutions which might be
involved in an institutional offer by statute, and the practicalities of
the business world assure that a numbers test is unnecessary in the
typical institutional offering - long-term debt of seasoned compa-
nies."
The principal (or equity) portion of the private offering exemption
in the Uniform Act is Section 402(b) (9) which provides an exemption
from securities registration in the case of:
" The Draftsmen of the Uniform Securities Act were Professor Louis Loss of the
Harvard Law School and Mr. Edward M. Cowett, his Research Assistant. Their com-
ments on the Uniform Act are published in their work, BLUE SKY LAw, (1958), which
is an invaluable tool to anyone working in the Blue Sky area. The authors indicate in
their work their desire to present a statute which did not depart from existing law so
much that it would be unacceptable to the various states.
"1 Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements? 1976 Wis.
L. REv. 79, 83.
" Loss & Cowm-r, BLUE SKY LAW 374 (1958).
4' See Position Papers, Private Exemption Under Section 4(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 31 Bus. LAW. 483, 525 (1975).
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(9) any transaction pursuant to an offer directed by the
offeror to not more than ten persons (other than those desig-
nated in paragraph (8)) in this state during any period of
twelve consecutive months, whether or not the offeror or any
of the offerees is then present in this state, if (A) the seller
reasonably believes that all the buyers in this state are pur-
chasing for investment, and (B) no commission or other remu-
neration is paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting any
prospective buyer in this state; but the Administrator may by
rule or order, as to any security or transaction or any type of
security or transaction, withdraw or further condition this ex-
emption, or increase or decrease the number of offerees permit-
ted, or waive the conditions in Clauses (A) and (B) with or
without the substitution of a limitation on remuneration.
The exemption has four principal attributes: (1) it provides two
objective tests in that the offer is precisely limited as to offerees and
to time - the offer may be made to not more than ten persons in the
state during any period of 12 consecutive months; (2) attention is
given to redistribution, because the seller must reasonably believe
that the buyers are purchasing for investment; (3) the selling effort
is strictly limited because the exemption is not available if any com-
mission or other remuneration is paid for soliciting any prospective
buyer; and (4) flexibility is provided through the provision that the
securities commissioner may withdraw or further condition the ex-
emption, increase or decrease the number of offerees permitted, or
waive any of the above conditions by rule or order. This latter power
has been used to some extent in recent years in several states."
Section 402(b)(9) of the Uniform Act is complemented by Section
402(b)(10) which exempts from registration:
(10) any offer or sale of a preorganization certificate or
subscription if (A) no commission or other remuneration is
paid or given directly or indirectly for soliciting any prospec-
tive subscriber, (B) the number of subscribers does not exceed
ten, and (C) no payment is made by any subscriber;
This section does not exempt the actual sale of the stock for the new
enterprise; it exempts only the offer (and sale) of the preincorporation
document. When the subscriptions are called, the offeror must come
within Section 402(b)(9), or register the stock.
11 See text of Section III C(2) infra.
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The concept of a merit review for privately placed securities is
retained in a somewhat attenuated form in the Uniform Act. Section
402(c) empowers the securities commissioner to revoke any Section
402(b) exemption, including the private placement and private offer-
ing exemptions, upon due notice and after fair hearing. Also, as we
have seen, Section 402(b)(9) itself specifically authorizes the securi-
ties commissioner to withdraw or further condition the exemption by
order as to a specific offering.
B. The Varieties of State Approaches to the Private Placement
Exemption
The heart of the problem for the offeror proposing a multi-state
private placement is the broad variety of state approaches to the
problem. There are at least seven general categories of approaches for
the equity financing area and a number of variations are found in
each of these categories.
1. General Exemption (Equity Financing)
First, we will examine the variations in the equity area:
(a) Limitations Based on Number of Offerees. This is by far the
most prevalent approach. Thirty-two states, the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico have adopted or substantially adopted the Uniform
Securities Act. 9 Most of these jurisdictions have followed the Uni-
form Act's concept of providing, as a threshold test of the availability
of the exemption, a limit on the number of persons to whom the
offering may be made." In addition, two states which have not
adopted the Uniform Securities Act nonetheless follow its basic pat-
tern so far as the equity private offering exemption is concerned.'
The "uniform" approach is in fact by no means uniform. The
principal variation is as to the number of offerees which are allowed.
The numbers range from the ten suggested by the Uniform Act 2 to
as many as 25,' 3 with some states choosing 15.11 Several states allow
' Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wis-
consin, Wyoming.
E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 53, § 38(1) (Supp. 1967).
" LA. REV. STAT. § 51.705(12) (1968); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04.06.9 (Supp. 1967).
5' E.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1435(8) (1967).
13 E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1748(b)(9) (1966).
-" E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 451.802(b)(9) (1970).
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the payment of commissions in connection with the offering,5 while
some limit the exemption to offerings made by domestic corpora-
tions."6 Several states which are denominated as Uniform Securities
Act states have so changed the private offering exemption provision
that it is virtually unrecognizable. 5 All of these states limit the "of-
fering" to a 12-month period.
The Uniform Act,58 and the statutes of some nonuniform states,5
provide that the securities commissioner may by rule or order, vary
the number of offerees or otherwise vary the limitations on the ex-
emption. Several states have established such variations by rule."0 It
is possible that some commissioners will vary the exemption by order
in a specific case, but we have been unable to identify any state in
which this has been done with any frequency.
A sometimes overlooked variation common to the offeree exemp-
tion variety of statute is the form of statute which on its face appears
to have an extraterritorial effect in its limitation. For example, the
statute of Vermont limits the exemption to cases in which "the num-
ber of offerees of such sale does not exceed twenty-five."', The com-
forting words of the Uniform Act (and of the acts of most offeree limi-
tation states) "in this state" are omitted. On its face, the statute
appears to prevent a multistate offering which exceeds twenty-five,
even though only one offeree is located in the state. It appears that
there is a constitutional question as to whether the exemption can be
construed in that fashion, although we have found no case in which
this issue was raised. Indeed, it is possible to interpret the statute as
meaning to relate the numbers test only to offers in the state, but at
least one commissioner has refused to accept that interpretation."
(b) Limitation Based on Number of Security Holders. Nine
11 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 7309(b)(9) (1973); MD. CODE ANN. § 11-602(9) (1975);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 402(b)(9) (1975); OREGON REV. STAT. § 59.035(12) (1967).
1S KANS. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262(h) (1963); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5384.5(9) (Supp.
1966); VT. STAT. ANN. § 9-4204(10) (1959).
" E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-114(a)(i) (1973), which exempts "any transaction
in this state not involving any public offering.
' See text of Section m A(2) supra.
E.g., LA. REV. STAT. § 51.705(12) (1968).
" See text of Section III C(2) infra.
, VT. STAT. ANN. § 9-4204(10) (1959). This problem also appears to exist in Indi-
ana, Missouri, New York, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming.
62 The prior Georgia Securities Act presented this problem, GA. CODE ANN. § 97-
107(j) (1968), and the securities commissioner's department took the position that all
participants wherever located, must be included in determining the number of permit-
ted offerees. Trotter and Copeland, An Appeal For Revision of the Georgia Securities
Act, 4 GA. L. REV. 341 n.39 (1970).
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states assure that the equity private offering exemption is limited to
close corporations by conditioning the exemption on the number of
security holders; i.e., the exemption is not available if there are more
than a specified number of security holders of the issuer when the
offer is completed . 3 Here, again, the practitioner is forced into the
numbers game, and the numbers vary widely, from a low of five in
Ohio 4 to a high of 35 in Texas. 5
Each of the states in this category restricts the exemption to offer-
ings made without payment of commission. It appears that the laws
of the states in this category purport to have an extraterritorial effect.
(c) Limitation Based on Capitalization of Issuer. Four states add
an additional complication by adding a new number - the aggregate
capitalization of the issuer, or the aggregate amount of money raised
in the offering.6 This limitation tends not only to assure that the
exemption is for the close corporation, but also that it is for the small
close corporation. And the effects of inflation in the past thirty-five
years without concurrent changes in the numbers have assured that
the exemption is only for the truly small corporation.
(d) Limitations Based on Number of Purchasers. Thirteen states
anticipated (or provided a model for) the Rule 146 approach in at
least one respect, by making the exemption turn on the number of
purchasers of the securities in the period - 12 months in each case.6
The failure to include "in this state" language in some of these stat-
utes creates difficult interpretative questions."
(e) Limitations Based on Local Offeror. Four states are essen-
tially out of consideration for a multistate equity private offering,
" CALIF. CORP. CODE § 25102(h) (1968); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 874(9)
(Supp. 1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5384.5(9) (Supp. 1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-
22(J) (1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707-03(0) (1964); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
581-5(I) (1964); VT. STAT. ANN. § 9-4204(10) (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(b)(8)
(1968); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 551.23(10) (1973).
" OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.03(o) (1964).
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5(I) (1964).
" ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/, § 137.4(G) (Supp. 1967); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5384.5(9)
(Supp. 1966); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.320(9) (1961); Rule of Arizona Corporate
Commission, Order S-1 (1966).
11 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.06(11) (1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 97-109(M) (1973); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 137.4(G) (Supp. 1976); IND. STAT. ANN. § 23-2-1-2(b)(10)
(Supp. 1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 203(9) (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.15(2)(h) (1971);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 409.402(b)(10) (1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 401(b)(9) (1971); PA. STAT.
ANN. § 203(d) (1973); S.D. CoMp. LAWS § 47-31-86.1 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-
1632(H) (1964); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 581-5(I) (1964); WASH. REV. CODE §
21.20.320(9) (1974).
" For example, Indiana.
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because their statutes limit the availability of the exemption to do-
mestic corporations of the state. 9 By way of duplication, the laws of
these states fall into categories one and two, above. These states
clearly follow the philosophy that the exemption should be limited
to small, local offerings. Happily, for those who believe a more flexi-
ble approach is in the best interests of the nation's economic well-
being, the number of states in this category is dwindling. 0
(f) Isolated Transaction States. Four states provide an addi-
tional means of effecting offerings without registration by making the
"isolated transactions" exemption available to issuers as well as indi-
viduals. 7' The typical statutory formulation of the isolated transac-
tion is ". . . one which is not made in the course of successive and
repeated transactions of a similar nature. . . ." Because of the nar-
rowness with which this exemption has been construed, it is probably
of slight utility.
(g) States Which Require Filing With Securities Commissioner
for Exemption. Twenty-one states require the issuer to take some
affirmative act with respect to the securities commissioner's office in
connection with the exemption." There are almost as many types of
filings required as there are states which require filings. These re-
quirements present the crucial question of whether it is necessary to
make the filing in order to achieve the exemption. It is beyond the
scope of this article to explore that question with respect to each of
these states. We note, however, the recent interesting case of Feitler
v. Midas Associates 1 in which it was held that failure to comply with
a rule of the Wisconsin securities commissioner requiring a filing
within ten days after a private placement has exceeded $100,000 did
not cause the issuer to lose the exemption because the commissioner,
in devising the rule, was only exercising his authority to require re-
ports of sales under the exemption, and not his authority to withdraw
or further condition the exemption. Presumably, the commissioner
11 KANS. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262(h) (1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 874(9)
(Supp. 1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 5384.5(9) (Supp. 1966); VT. STAT. ANN. § 9-4204 (10)
(1959). In addition, Wisconsin provides a 15-shareholders exemption for corporations
whose principal place of business is in the state. WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 551.23(10) (Supp.
1968).
Compare FLA. STAT. § 517.06(11) (1967) with FLA. STAT. § 517.06(11) (1971).
T, KANS. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262(h) (1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80A.15(2)(h) (1971);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04.06.9 (Supp. 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-11-9(a) (1969).
72 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin.
11 BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. 366 at A-6 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 5, 1976).
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will change the result for future cases by changing the rule.
(h) The Overall Effect of the Merit Review Power On the Private
Offering Exemption. As indicated above, the Blue Sky laws, in their
inception were paternalistic in approach, as opposed to the avowed
disclosure approach of the 1933 Act. In the state approach there are
found various statutory formulations which allow the securities com-
missioners to prohibit an offering in his state if he finds reason to
doubt the fairness of the offering to citizens of his state. This doctrine
is articulated in a variety of formulations, which allow the securities
commissioners to revoke or deny effectiveness to a registration state-
ment if he finds the offering not to be "fair, just and equitable" or
not based on "sound business principles."74
These merit review statutes apply to registered offerings, and
since the sanction is for the commissioner to deny effectiveness to a
registration statement, they do not have application in the private
placement situation, where registration is not necessary. However,
there is yet an element of the merit review concept in the state ap-
proach to the private placement exemption. This is exemplified by
Section 402(c) of the Uniform Securities Act which provides that the
securities commissioner may by order deny or revoke certain exemp-
tions including the private placement exemption and the financial
institutional exemption with respect to a specific security or transac-
tion. The section goes on to provide that this action can be taken only
upon notice and after opportunity for a hearing and that no order
under the section may vperate retroactively.
The state variations on this theme are many, but virtually all
states allow the commissioner to revoke certain exemptions. We have
found no case in which this power was tested or interpreted in the
private placement area, and it is difficult to see how a commissioner's
staff, usually extremely small in terms of the tasks assigned to it,
could make effective use of this power except in the states requiring
prior filings before completion of the private placement.
2. Institutional Investor Exemption
There is substantially more uniformity in the Blue Sky approach
to the private placement exemption for offerings to institutional
investors. All of the states (plus Puerto Rico and the District of Col-
umbia) which have a securities registration requirement also have an
exemption for offerings to institutional investors, and of the three
1' See UNIFORM SEcuRmEs Acr § 306(a)(2)E.
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non-securities registration states one has a Uniform Act-type exemp-
tion which provides that one selling an offering to institutions need
not register as a dealer."
A major advantage of the separate Blue Sky exemption for institu-
tions is that it avoids the general Blue Sky prohibition against pay-
ment of commissions in private offerings. The great majority of long-
term debt institutional private placements are made through invest-
ment bankers who work on a commission basis.
Proponents of state uniformity have little to find fault with in
regard to the Blue Sky approach to the institutional exemption. None
of the 34 jurisdictions which have used the Uniform Act has varied
the Section 402(b) (8) formulation to any significant degree,76 an addi-
tional three" jurisdictions which did not use the Uniform Act have
essentially the same formulation as Section 402(b)(8), and the re-
maining twelve 8 securities registration states have the same basic
provisions as to types of institutions to whom offerings are exempted.
These formulations all cover the standard institutional buyer -
banks, savings and loan associations, insurance companies, mutual
funds, and employee benefit plans.
Problems occur in anticipating new types of institutions which
should be included in the exempt category. The Uniform Act solution
to this problem is to exempt any "other financial institution or insti-
tutional buyer," and also to leave to the securities commissioner the
power to define the term by an interpretative rule. A number of
states provide what appears to be an even more useful, and rational,
broad brush exemption by including in the exemption sales to:
a person a principal part of whose business consists of
buying securities."0
" This is New York. N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS § 359e(1)(a) (1975). Connecticut and New
Hampshire require that only a registered broker-dealer may sell a private placement
to institutions, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-322(a)(6)(A) (1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
421:7 (1971).
"' See text of Section III A(2) supra.
" ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 874.8 (Supp. 1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-71-53-
7 (Supp. 1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-11-9(b) (1956).
11 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1844.8 (1967); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(i) (1968); FLA.
STAT. § 517.06(5) (1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 97-109(G) (1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-
'12, 137.4(c) (1967); LA. REV. STAT. § 51:705(5) (1968); OHIo REV. CODE § 1707.03(D)
(1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-06.5 (Supp. 1967); S.D. CODE § 47-31-88 (1967); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-1632(E) (1964); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5(H) (1964); VT.
STAT. ANN. § 9-4204(5) (Supp. 1975).
" UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT § 412(a).
10 E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1844(8) (1967).
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Probably the real estate investment company is covered by either of
these approaches,"' and the small business investment company is
covered, perhaps with somewhat less surety.2 The ingenuity-,of the
business world will undoubtedly create new investment vehicles
whose qualifications as institutional investors that should or should
not be included in the exemption must be considered."
One always surprising aspect of the Blue Sky institutional exemp-
tion is the broad, and apparently archaic, language in the formula-
tions of seven states which exempt sales to any corporations. 4
C. Recent Trends in Blue Sky Private Placement Exemptions
1. Statutory Trends
There has been a considerable amount of statutory revision in the
Blue Sky area in the current decade.85 These revisions show a distinc-
tive trend toward liberalizing and clarifying the private placement
exemption. Four states which did not have a private placement ex-
emption at all in 1970 have adopted the exemption. One state which
had limited the exemption to domestic corporations has removed that
limitation."1 Six states which already had the exemption have in-
creased the permissible number of offerees or purchasers.M Three
states have abandoned the proscription on commissions for soliciting
buyers,8 although the prohibition still holds sway in most states.
"I The Georgia statute expressly exempts a real estate investment company. GA.
CODE ANN. § 97-109(G) (1976).
" Again, the Georgia statute expressly exempts small business investment compa-
nies. GA. CODE ANN. § 97-109(G) (1976). Minnesota, on the other hand, specifically
denies the exemption for a sale to a small business investment company unless it can
be "demonstrated that it possesses adequate sophistication with respect to the specific
offer and sale." Minn. Admin. Regs. S. Div. 2117, 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. 26.610 at
22,562.
An example is the service corporation of a savings and loan association. Hawaii
exempts sales to any institution which is tax exempt under INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
OF 1954, § 501(c)(3).
"' FLA. STAT. § 517.06(5) (1971); ILL. REV. STAT. § 4(c) (Supp. 1967); LA. REV. STAT.
§ 51-705(5) (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-17(8) (1975); OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.03(D)
(1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1632(E) (1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-513(b)(7) (1968).
Pennsylvania, with somewhat more logic, exempts sales to a corporation with a net
worth of $10,000,000 and which can meet certain earnings tests. PA. SEc. REGs. §
112.1111(a). BLUE SKY L. REP. 11'1301.
Eighteen states have substantially changed their Blue Sky Laws since 1970.
Minnesota, North Dakota, Pennsylvania and South Dakota.
Il Florida.
A Florida, California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, and Louisiana.
2 Georgia, Illinois, and Louisiana.
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Finally, four states have shifted from an offeree-oriented numbers
test to a purchaser numbers test,"0 a change which facilitates both
compliance in general as well as coordination with the federal ap-
proach.
2. State Reaction to Rule 146
From the standpoint of federal-state coordination, the most im-
portant current question is: how have the states reacted to Rule 146?
The answer is that in the relatively short period that has elapsed
since the Rule was adopted in June, 1974, there has been a surpris-
ingly prompt and significant reaction to Rule 146 at the state level.
Seven states have adopted its philosophy, either by statute or by
regulation." One state has rejected it, and clearly articulated its rea-
sons for doing so."
The states which have adopted Rule 146 as a private placement
exemption have done so in a variety of ways, again evidencing the real
and sometimes baffling diversity of the federal system.
Hawaii took the simplest approach. In 1975, its legislature added
a section to its blue sky law exempting from the registration provi-
sions:
Any offer or sale not involving a public offering within the
meaning of Rule 146 (Code of Federal Regulations Section
230.146) or any successor rule, as amended from time to time,
of the Securities and Exchange Commission. 3
Arizona also has taken a simple approach. Its private exemption
is almost verbatim the same as the 1933 Act's Section 4(2) in that it
exempts, "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offer-
ing."94 Acting under his rule-making power, the Arizona securities
commissioner adopted almost verbatim Rule 146 in defining what is
meant by this exemption."
Delaware and Maryland jointly took a straightforward approach.
Each of these states had adopted Section 402(b)(9) of the Uniform
Act almost verbatim (using 25 as the number of offerees). On October
24, 1974, just four months after the effective date of Rule 146, the
securities commissioners of these states exercised their power under
10 Colorado, Georgia, Indiana and Washington.
Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Minnesota, and Utah.
,2 California.
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 485-6(15) (1968).
4 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1844.1 (1975).
gs ARIZ. CORP. COMM. REGS. Order No. S-26, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 6676 at 2510.
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this formulation of the private placement exemption to vary the ex-
emption by adopting the substance of Rule 146 for intrastate offerings
and by adding a further provision that any offering which complies
with Rule 146 is deemed to be in compliance with the states' exemp-
tive rule upon the filing of a specified form for interstate offerings. 6
Delaware and Maryland had been in the forefront of attempts to
clarify the private placement exemption; the securities commission-
ers of those states had previously utilized their rule-making power to
adopt a "purchaser" rather than "offeree" test, and the well-reasoned
Release of the Delaware commissioner accompanying the new rule
states that the commissioners recognize ". . . that Rule 146 is an
improvement, in a number of respects, over their states' current
rules. . . .."1 The Release goes on to express a strong view in favor
of uniformity in blue sky regulation:
More significantly, because of compliance confusion attrib-
utable to the lack of conformity among the various states
among themselves and the SEC respecting the conditions of a
private offering exemption, the Commissioners, serving two
contiguous states, propose to adopt jointly the same rule. The
Commissioners hope their joint action will not only contribute
to federal and state uniformity respecting Maryland and Dela-
ware private offerings, but also will serve as an example to spur
conformity in state securities regulation in other areas where
confusion and complexity abound. 8
Minnesota has also adopted the basic form of the Uniform Act's
private placement exemption, except that its numbers test is 25 pur-
chasers. The Minnesota commissioner has kept the substance of the
Uniform Act exemption and added aspects of Rule 146 by adopting
a rule increasing the number of allowed purchasers in the state to 35
if the sales are made in compliance with Rule 146.11
The Colorado approach is substantially different. That state's
statute is based on the Uniform Securities Act, but the private offer-
ing exemption provision departs substantially from the Uniform Act
formulation. The statute provides an exemption for a transaction
"not involving a public offering" or one which the securities commis-
sioner exempts by rule or by order upon his finding that the protec-
" Del. Sec. Rel. (October 24, 1974), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 11,653 at 7522.
" Id. at 7524.
"Id.
" Minn. Admin. Regs. S. Div. 2118(b), 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. 26,610 at 22,562.
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tions afforded by registration are not required. 00 Acting under this
statute, the commissioner adopted a rule'0' which provides an exemp-
tion where: (a) there is compliance with Rule 146; (b) a Claim for
Exemption has been filed; and (apparently): (i) the number of pur-
chasers does not exceed 35; (ii) a minimum cash investment of
$5,000; (iii) unless the investment exceeds $150,000, any offeree must
meet certain minimum gross annual income and net worth tests; (iv)
detailed questionnaires are obtained from the offeree showing the
suitability of the investment for him and his (or his offeree represent-
atives') investment sophistication. This appears to be a remarkable
blend of the federal and paternalistic approaches, but it focuses on
the original purpose of a private placement exemption - that the
offerees do not need the protection of registration.
Utah has adopted the Utah Uniform Securities Act, although the
statute varies in some degree from the original Act. That Act does not
contain the Uniform Act Section 402(b) (9) private placement exemp-
tion; instead, it exempts "any isolated transaction."'0 2 But the Act
empowers the securities commissioner to make such rules "as are
necessary to carry out the provisions" of the statute,' 3 and it contains
a provision that:
This Act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact
it and to coordinate the interpretation and administration of
this act with the related federal regulation. 04
Pursuant to this authority, the commissioner has adopted a rule'05
which provides that an offer is "an isolated transaction" if: (a) there
are 35 or fewer purchasers in the state in a 12-month period; (b) an
application is filed in advance; (c) the investors meet the suitability
standards of Rule 146(d); and (d) the investors receive a disclosure
statement, previously filed with the commissioner, which contains
the information set forth in Rule 146(e). This approach is similar to
the Georgia small offering registration - much of the philosophy of
Rule 146 is accepted, but it is required that the purchaser be given a
disclosure statement, rather than the Rule 146(E)(1)(i) alternative
merely that he "shall have access" to the type of information that
' COLO. REv. STAT. § 11-51-114(2)(i) (1963).
'0' COLO. Div. SEC. Rule 817, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 9709 at 5636.
"= UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-14(2)(a) (1967).
"3 UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-24 (1967).
"3 UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-27 (1967).
"3 UTAH SEC. COMM. RULE A67-03-7, 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 47,607 at 43,515.
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would be provided if the offer had been registered.
After providing the liberality of a Rule 146-type approach, the
Utah commission stresses that the offeror seeking the private place-
ment exemption must come within that type of exemption as a pract-
ical matter, because subparagraph four of the order says that other-
wise an isolated transaction means that the seller of securities is
entitled to make two sales within a twelve-month period of time.,"
California is the one state which considered and rejected the Rule
146 concept and articulated its reasons for doing so. It must be re-
membered, of course, that California is a leading exponent of the
merit review, or patriarchal, approach to securities regulation. It does
not have a typical private offering exemption, and the Securities
Department examines any proposed issues from the standpoint of
whether they are fair, just and equitable.' The reasons for rejection
of the Rule 146 approach were set forth in the Corporate Securities
Newsletter for November, 1974 published by the California Depart-
ment of Corporations. 08 This release stated that the contributing
elements for rejecting the approach were:
. . . the keen interest of the State in local securities trans-
actions and the fundamental differences between a disclosure
standard and a fair, just and equitable standard. 9
The release goes on to note that the California law imposes on the
commissioner the affirmative burden of reviewing each proposed se-
curities transaction from the standpoint of fairness, and the Rule 146
type of approach is inconsistent with meeting that burden."0
3. Effect of Proposed Federal Securities Code on Blue Sky Private
Placement Exemption
As we have explained in Section H F above, the American Law
Institute is sponsoring the development of a proposed Federal Securi-
ties Code. We have described the private placement provisions of the
proposed Code in Section II F, and it is appropriate at this point to
examine the effect of the proposed Code on the State private place-
ment exemption.
As we have noted, the Federal Securities Code's limited offering
exemption, which is somewhat reminiscent of Rule 146, is probably
I /d.
'O' CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140(a) (1968).




900 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXIII
less restrictive than the private placement exemptions of most of the
state Blue Sky Laws."' There consequently arises the interesting and
somewhat perplexing question of the preemptive effect of the Federal
Securities Code on the various state private placement exemptions.
The Code states that it "is exclusive and plenary in the area [of
registration] with respect to a state whose procedure in that area is
not substantially coordinated with the procedure [of the Code]." '
The Code proceeds to provide that a state's procedure is "substan-
tially coordinated" when the state accepts the commission's forms
and waiting periods for purposes of its own comparable require-
ments."' The Code thus implies that a state law which is "coordi-
nated" will not be preempted by the Code.
The question then must be raised, what if a particular state has
a narrower exemption than that of the Code? If the state is "coordi-
nated," then presumably the offeror will be required to register under
the state law even though the offering is exempt under the Code. On
the other hand, if the state is not coordinated, the Code seems to say
that the state law is preempted and no registration would be required.
Professor Louis Loss of the Harvard Law School, the Reporter for
the proposed Code, however, seems to take the position that there is
no preemption in the private placement exemption area:
Otherwise the areas in which there is no preemption are the
postdistribution exemptions in § 511(b) and (c) . . .the
$100,000 exemption of local distributions in § 513, the offering
of interests or instruments that do not come within the Code's
definition of "security" and, of course, the "limited offer-
ing.'''14
It therefore appears to us that the question of the proposed Code's
preemption of the state limited offering exemptions is unsettled and
that some further clarification of this question is required.
IV. MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE APPROACHES TO
PRIVATE PLACEMENT ExEMPTION
It is evident from the preceding material that there are major
See text of Section II F supra.
2 FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1603(a)(1). (Tentative Draft No. 3, October 1,
1974).
"I FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1603(a)(2). (Tentative Draft No. 3, October 1,
1974).
"I FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE at 143. (Tentative Draft No. 3, October 1, 1974).
(Reporter's Commentary).
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differences in the approaches to the private placement problem be-
tween the 1933 Act on the one hand and the varying Blue Sky ap-
proaches on the other. These provide a complexity to any multistate
private placement (except, in most cases, an institutional investor
offering) "-' which often results in extra costs and sometimes prevents
the completion of a private placement along the lines originally pro-
posed. It is also obvious from the preceding material that the private
placement exemption of each state in which a private placement is
proposed to be made must be reviewed in advance with care.
1. No Mesh Between Federal and State Approaches; The Num-
bers Game. The principal practical difference is that no securities
registration state has a private placement exemption which meshes
with Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act, and very few have an exemption
which meshes with Rule 146.116
As a result, the major difficulty in achieving a federal-state mesh
arises from the numbers game. The development of the residual law
under Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act has seemingly made it clear that
there is no precise limitation on the number of offerees or of purchas-
ers which may be present in a Section 4(2) offering."7 The state
approach, on the other hand, is almost invariably to provide a precise
numbers test - usually a limit on the number of offerees. Thus, for
example, an offering that is clearly exempt under Section 4(2) could,
at the same time, not qualify for a Blue Sky exemption in either state
if the offering were made to a total of 27 offerees in Arkansas and
Louisiana."' Further, Rule 146 doesn't solve this problem. To be sure,
it provides an objective numbers test, but that test is in terms of
purchasers rather than the typical state test of offerees. Again, an
offering to 27 offerees, all of whom purchase the securities, might
easily comply with Rule 146, but would not qualify for an exemption
if made in both Arkansas and Louisiana.
Another aspect of the numbers game problem is posed by states
whose offeree limitation is not modified by the phrase "in this state."
Under a literal construction of this language, the state's numbers test
will control the offering if the offer is made in the state at all."'
"I Of course one-state offering does not involve the same complications, but the
Blue Sky exemptions, because of their variety, still present shoals in a one-state pri-
vate placement which meets the 1933 Act exemption for any reason including the
intrastate exemption of Section 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11).
" See text of Section HI C(2) supra.
" See text of Section I C supra.
"' ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1248(b)(9) (1966) (25 offerees); LA. REV. STAT. §
51.705(12) (1968) (25 offerees).
"I See text of Section HI B(1)(a) supra.
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Yet one more variation of the numbers game problem is presented
by those states which limit the shareholders or capitalization, or
both, of the offeror.'
2
1
2. State Filing Requirements. A second major difference be-
tween the federal and state approaches stems from the filing require-
ments of some states. Neither Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act nor Rule
146 requires that anything be filed with the SEC to secure the exemp-
tion (but Rule 240 requires a filing). Twenty-three states, on the other
hand, require that some type of document be filed with the securities
commissioner in connection with the exemption. These filings vary
from a simple post-sale statement of who purchased the securities
to a complete pre-sale offering circular which will be reviewed by the
securities commissioner from, among other things, the standpoint of
whether the offering is fair, just and equitable.
12
3. Payment of Commissions. A third major difference is the typi-
cal state prohibition against payment of commissions in a private
placement (except in the case of an institutional investor placement).
This prohibition is nowhere present in the federal approach. This
prohibition often has the effect of keeping a perfectly sound venture
capital situation from being placed because the issuer may not know
where the money is and the investment banker who does may not
place the securities without a commission. It also tends to limit some-
what the selling effort for tax shelter offerings. A number of states are
doing away with this limitation, and venture capital financing tends
to move to those states.'
22
4. Domestic Corporation Limitation. A fourth major difference
is posed by the laws of the states which limit the private offering to
domestic corporations.' No multistate offerings can be made from
outside such states.
5. Miscellaneous. Two other major differences, which are not
within the scope of this paper, but which should be considered in
greater detail are: (a) in some states the private placement exemption
for a secondary offering is not clear;' 24 and (b) in some other states
the private placement must be made by a registered broker-dealer.'
2 5
120 See text of Section III B(1) (b)-(c) supra.
2I See text of Section III B(1)(g) supra.
'2 See text of Section III C(1) supra.
'' See text of Section III B(1)(e) supra.
20 A secondary offering is one made by a person other than the issuer.
,25 Arizona, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, and Texas.
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V. POSSIBLE SOLUTION - UNIFORMITY OF APPROACH
In recent years, the difficulties presented by the varying state
approaches to the private placement exemption have attracted some
scholarly attention, and considerable criticism, the essence of which
is that the state approaches make it too difficult for new business or
struggling venture capital companies to acquire investment capital.'26
These critics have, in effect, urged that the state differences be abol-
ished and that all states adopt a uniform exemption based on the
federal approach - in short, a uniform private placement exemption.
There are sound arguments supporting this position, and, perhaps,
equally sound arguments which support the present status.
A. Arguments In Favor of Uniformity
The merit of a uniform approach is simplicity. The sweeping away
of the state variations would ease the multistate private placement
offeror's task immensely in that he would be concerned with only one
set of rules, rather than as many sets as there are states in which it
is proposed to make the offering. The argument goes on to state that
state variations are unnecessary; the varying numbers tests are arbi-
trary and the numbers test approach gives no attention to the invest-
ment sophistication of the offerees. The requirement for filings are
either a trap for the unwary, or an overly officious state interference
with the right of an informed investor to make a fool of himself with
his money. The restrictions against payment of commissioners, justi-
fied on the ground of preventing the dilution of the investor's capital,
serves rather to prevent the business venture from finding the knowl-
edgeable capitalist. Finally, there is simply no rational justification
for the state approach which limits the exemption to domestic corpo-
rations.
B. Arguments Against Uniformity
The principal argument against uniformity is that there is no
certain truth as to what is the best type of private placement exemp-
tion. The federal approach has been criticized for years as being
entirely unsatisfactory.' 7 The Draftsmen of the Uniform Securities
,29 Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on New Business Promotions, 1969 DUKE L.J.
273; Garcia & Kantor, Dark Clouds In a Blue Sky: An Analysis of the Limited Offering
Exemption, 28 U. MImI L. REv. 568 (1969).
I" See Position Papers, Private Exemption Under Section 4(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 31 Bus. LAW. 483, 489 (1975).
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Act wrote that the one recommendation they received about the pri-
vate placement exemption which was virtually unanimous was to
stay away from the vague and undefined federal approach of "public
offering."' ' It took 41 years of confusing experience before a serious
attempt was made at the federal level to clarify the private placement
exemption, and that attempt, Rule 146, has been criticized and will
undoubtedly be the subject of further criticism.' 9 In short, it is
argued that the states should continue to serve the function ac-
credited to them by Justice Brandeis of serving as laboratories for
the development of laws. And in justification of that view it must be
noted that Rule 146 drew on state experience.
Another major argument against uniformity reaches a major dif-
ference between the federal and state securities statutes; i.e., whether
the federal disclosure approach or the state merit, or parens patriae
approach, is the proper method to regulate the sale of securities. As
noted, some states require some pre-sale review by the securities
commissioner before a private placement sale can be made. In these
states, the commissioner can refuse to allow the offering to proceed
if he decides it does not have sufficient business merit.' The great
battle on philosophies of securities regulation was fought when the
1933 Act was adopted,' 3 but the battle did not end the war. A recent
article has examined the uses of the merit review for public offerings
in Wisconsin, and found the review to be of considerable value to the
public.' 32 Possibly the same argument could be made to support the
merit review for private placements.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In summary, the private placement exemptions of both the fed-
eral and the Blue Sky formulations have not reached perfection, and
the present state of interrelationships between the federal and state
approaches is far from satisfactory.
The uncertainty about the limits of the exemption under Section
4(2) of the 1933 Act has been a source of doubt and of litigation for
43 years, and the promulgation of Rule 146 has not solved the ques-
tions.
' Loss & Cowm'T, BLUE SKY LAW, supra note 46, at 373.
See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
'' See text of Section III a(1) supra.
' ' See Loss, 1 SECURITIES REGULATION 121-28 (2d ed. 1961); Landis, The Legisla-
tive History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959).
,32 See Goodkind, Blue Sky Law: Is There Merit in the Merit Requirements? 1976
Wis. L. REV. 79.
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The extreme diversity of state approaches to the private place-
ment exemption have built far too many shoals in the Rule 146 safe
harbor. In particular, the odd results achieved by the numbers game
are unacceptable. In addition, the various state approaches are sub-
ject to criticism on their own merits. For example, the Uniform Se-
curities Act formulation, which is the pattern of the majority of state
approaches, does not give any attention to the investor's sophistica-
tion; i.e., his need for the protections afforded by registration.
The question of whether the federal disclosure approach or the
state merit review approach to securities regulation is best is a part
of this problem, and that has not, and may never, be resolved.
We think it is clear that these questions will not be wholly an-
swered by one, or a dozen, law review articles. The issues involved
are far too complex. The private placement exemption is one of the
most important aspects of the securities laws. We think that the
problems pointed out by this paper are of sufficient importance and
complexity to warrant the establishment of a funded study project to
consider and recommend a satisfactory approach for both federal and
state laws.
We are not ready to accept the somewhat simplistic approach of
abolishing the Blue Sky laws through federal preemption, because we
think the Blue Sky laws have an extremely useful place in our coun-
try's securities regulatory system.
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